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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred upon the Court 
of Appeals by Sections 77-35-26(2)(a) and 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah 
Code (1988). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant William Clifford Bartley ("Bartley") was 
convicted of theft, a third degree felony, after a jury trial on 
April 12-13, 1988. The Seventh District Court, Honorable Boyd 
Bunnell presiding (the "District Court"), entered its final 
Findings, Judgment and Commitment on May 10, 1988, committing 
Bartley to the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1. Can peace officers set up a road block when there 
is no evidence that a crime has been committed? 
2. Does driving a pickup pulling a trailer with tanks 
on it on a county road at night, when there is no evidence that a 
crime has been committed, give rise to an "articulable suspicion" 
sufficient to justify a stop? 
3. When the above facts are combined with an odor of 
gas condensate, but there is still no evidence of the commission 
of a crime, is there probable cause to arrest? 
4. Did the District Court err in admitting evidence 
of Bartley's possession of a concealed handgun at the time of 
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arrest? 
5. Did the District Court err in admitting testimony 
that confiscated vehicles and trailers had disappeared from the 
impound yard, when no evidence connects Bartley to the 
disappearance? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Interpretation of the following constitutional 
provisions, statutes and rules is determinative of this appeal: 
Constitutional Provisions 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated . . . . 
U. S. Constitution, Amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated . . . . 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Sec. 14 
Statutes 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
Section 77-7-15, Utah Code (1988) 
A peace officer may . . . , without warrant, 
arrest a person: 
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(2) When he has reasonable cause to believe 
a felony has been committed and has 
reasonable cause to believe that the person 
arrested has committed it . . • . 
Section 77-7-2(2), Utah Code (1988) 
Rules 
Evidence which. Is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if it's probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by consideration of undue delay, 
waste of time or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence 
of a person's character or a trait of his 
character is not admissible for the purpose 
of proving that he acted in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of 
a pertinent trait of his character 
offered by an accused, or by the 
prosecution to rebut the same; 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the final Findings, Judgment: and 
Commitment entered by the District Court on May 10, 1988, 
following a jury trial on April 12-13, 19 88. Bartley was 
convicted at the trial of the theft of gas condensate or 
"dripgas" having a value of more than $250.00, but less than 
$1,000.00, from Wintershall Oil & Gas, on or about December 27, 
1986. 
The trial followed a hearing on a Motion to Suppress, 
first heard with respect to defendant Jay Charles Wade ("Wade") 
on December 1, 1987, (see Transcript of Hearing on Motion to 
Suppress dated December 1, 1987, hereinafter referred to as 
"Motion Tr.), and heard on the same facts with respect to Bartley 
on April 12, 19 88, (see Trial Transcript, Volume I, pp. 2-3, 
hereinafter referred to as the "Trial Tr.M). The Motion to 
Suppress was based upon the violation of the constitutional 
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures. The 
District Court denied the motion. Counsel for Bartley and Wade 
objected at trial to the introduction of evidence gained pursuant 
to the stop and subsequent arrest, but those objections were 
overruled. Trial Tr. I at 64, Trial Tr. II at 127. 
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Statement of Facts 
San Juan County is located in the Southeastern corner 
of Utah. U. S. Highway 191 runs South from Monticello, Utah, to 
Blanding, Utah, Bluff, Utah and then South into Arizona. U. S. 
Highway 666 runs East from Monticello to Dove Creek and Cortez, 
Colorado. State Roads 163 and 262 run East from Bluff to 
Montezuma Creek and Aneth. 
The portion of San Juan County lying East of U. S. 
Highway 191, South of U. S. Highway 666, and North of State Roads 
163 and 262 is full of farms and ranches, a portion of the Navajo 
Indian Reservation and producing oil fields. A county road 
connects at the Utah-Colorado state line with a road from Dove 
Creek, Colorado, and runs generally South and West across Bug 
Point, Squaw Point, into Patterson Canyon, and on to Perkins 
Ranch. Trial Tr. Ill at 250-251. The road then forks. One fork 
goes West to Blanding, Utah. The other proceeds South to 
Montezuma Creek, Utah. Motion Tr. at 6-7, Trial Tr. I at 58-59. 
Both Wade and Bartley live in the North end of the area served by 
this road. Trial Tr. Ill at 325-327. 
The county road is used by local farmers, ranchers and 
Navajos in the Hatch and Montezuma Creek areas. Motion Tr. at 
67, Trial Tr. I at 58-59. It is also used by several oil 
companies for access to oil and gas wells in eastern San Juan 
County. When gas from some of the wells is compressed for 
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delivery into a pipeline, a condensate is formed, often referred 
to as dripgas. Trial Tr. Ill at 257. There are other oil fields 
in San Juan County from which dripgas is produced, including the 
Lisbon oil field between Monticello and Moab. Trial Tr. I at 68-
69. Dripgas can be burned as fuel in internal combustion engines 
and had been so used by one of the state's witnesses. Trial Tr. 
Ill at 271. Another witness for the state testified that a mine 
in the area of the Lisbon oil field used dripgas in its mining 
equipment. Trial Tr. Ill at 292-294. 
The San Juan County Sheriff's office had received 
reports of theft of dripgas from the Patterson Canyon area in 
19 86, but had not followed up on the reports. Motion Tr. at 10. 
Then, on December 26, 1986, at about 10:30 p.m.the Sheriff's 
Office received a report that three pickups with tanks and 
trailers were seen going South on the county road near Bug Point. 
Motion Tr. at 3. Sheriff Rigby Wright ("Wright") and Jack Kirby 
("Kirby"), his chief deputy, decided to investigate. Motion Tr. 
at 3. 
Wright and Kirby drove to Dove Creek, then drove South 
on the San Juan County road to what Wright referred to as the 
"Long place", which was about ten miles North of the oil wells. 
Motion Tr. at 4, Trial Tr. I at 61. They there conferred with 
Robert Knuckles ("Knuckles") and Charles Williams ("Williams"), 
two oil field service workers. Trial Tr. I at 60. At this time 
7 
there was still no evidence that any crime had been committed. 
Motion Tr. at 14. Knuckles and Williams were instructed to stay 
at the Long place. Trial Tr, I at 61. 
Wright and Kirby then proceeded South on the county 
road about half the distance to the oil wells. Trial Tr. I at 
61. They stopped their car in the middle of a downward curving 
section of the road at about 12:30 a.m. Trial Tr. I at 62r 65. 
The car driven by Wright and Kirby had no overhead lights and was 
equipped only with a red spotlight. Trial Tr. I at 63. Kirby 
stayed with the car. Trial Tr. I at 63. Wright walked on down 
the road about 50 yards and stood in the trees. Motion Tr. at 
11, Trial Tr. I at 63. They intended to stop every vehicle 
coming up the road. Motion Tr. at 9-10. 
Both Wright and Kirby testified that they saw three 
sets of headlights coming up the road. Trial Tr. I at 62, Trial 
Tr. II at 127-128. Kirby stopped the first vehicle, a Ford 
vehicle pulling a trailer with three tanks on it. Trial Tr. I at 
63. That vehicle was driven by Wade. Trial Tr. I at 63. The 
second vehicle, a Dodge pickup pulling a trailer with a tank on 
it, was driven by Hartley. Trial Tr. I at 63. Bartley stopped 
his truck behind Wade, got out of the pickup and began walking up 
the road toward the Sheriff's car. Trial Tr. I at 66. Wright 
then stepped out of the trees and told Bartley to stop. Trial 
Tr. I at 66. The third set of headlights never came around the 
8 
corner. Motion Tr. at 12. 
After the vehicles were stopped, both Wright and Kirby 
observed a "dripgas" odor. Motion Tr. at 11, Trial Tr. I at 67-
68, Trial Tr. II at 131. Wright compared the odor with what he 
had smelled out by the Lisbon oil field. Trial Tr. I at 68-69. 
Kirby compared the odor with the smell in oil fields in Oklahoma 
where he had worked earlier in his life. Trial Tr. il at 131-
133. Both Wade and Bartley were immediately placed under arrest 
and put in the back of the car Motion Tr. at 12. Neither was 
asked to explain his presence on the road. Motion Tr. at 11-12. 
The state was permitted, over Bartley1s objection, to introduce 
evidence that Bartley had a handgun tucked in his pants when he 
was arrested. Trial Tr. I at 80-82, Trial Tr. II at 128. 
Bartley had been charged in justice court with carrying a 
concealed dangerous weapon, but was never convicted. See Plea 
Agreement in Civil No. 704, 739 and 742, at pages 167-171 of the 
Record. 
After Wade and Bartley had been arrested, the sherifffs 
office was instructed to contact Knuckles and Williams and tell 
them to come on down. Trial Tr. II at 177-178. Wright and Kirby 
then spent about an hour looking for the "third vehicle", which 
they never found. Trial Tr. I at 70. They then drove to the 
area of the wells, where they met Knuckles and Williams. Trial 
Tr. I at 7 0-71. Knuckles and Williams showed them a tank from 
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which dripgas was missing. Trial Tr. I at 7 0-71. 
Wade and Hartley were then taken to the San Juan County 
Jail. Trial Tr. I at 78, Trial Tr. II at 134. Their clothing 
was confiscated as evidence. Trial Tr. I at 78, Trial Tr. II at 
134, At trial, samples from clothing stains were later compared 
with dripgas samples from the well. Trial Tr. II at 225-229. 
Their boots were compared with boot prints at the well site and a 
picture of Wade's trailer tire was compared with a picture of a 
tire track at the well site. Trial Tr. II at 221-225, Trial Tr. 
Ill at 240-246. Their pickups and trailers were impounded in 
Monticello, and pictures were taken of them. Trial Tr. I at 78, 
Trial Tr. II at 141-142. Samples were not taken from the tanks 
on December 27, 1986, and on the morning of December 28, 1986, 
the pickups, trailers and tanks were gone. Trial Tr. I at 114-
121. The District Court permitted, over Bartley's objection, 
testimony that the pickups and trailers had been unlawfully 
removed from the impound yard. Trial Tr. I at 114-122. Bartley 
had been charged with tampering with evidence in connection with 
that disappearance, but the charges were dismissed at the 
preliminary hearing. See Plea Agreement in Civil No. 7 04, 7 39 
and 742, pp. 167-171 of the Record. 
Wade and Bartley introduced testimony that the 
condensate they were transporting had been purchased by Bartley 
from Alva Rockwell, who had obtained it in the area of the Lisbon 
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oil field. Trial Tr. Ill at 306-308. Rockwell testified that he 
left the tank and trailer with the condensate on State Road 9 5 
near Blanding, Utah. Trial Tr. Ill at 321-322. Wade testified 
that on the evening of December 26, 1986, Bartley came to his 
house, told him that he had been bringing the condensate up from 
Blanding on the county road, but had been unable to pull the load 
up a hill. Trial Tr. Ill at 326-328. He requested Wade's help. 
Trial Tr. Ill at 328. Wade testified that, after eating dinner, 
he took his pickup and trailer down with Bartley, that they 
pumped some of the condensate into his tanks, and headed up the 
hill. Trial Tr. Ill at 328-330. Several miles up the road, they 
were stopped by Wright and Kirby. Trial Tr. Ill at 330-331. 
Bartley had previously been convicted of a felony theft 
in Colorado, and did not take the stand. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Officers Wright and Kirby set up what amounted to a 
roadblock on a county road that serves farms, ranches, Navajos 
and oil field traffic. This was not a routine roadblock to check 
licenses or vehicle safety. The peace officers intended to stop 
every traveler in order to find someone who had stolen dripgas. 
However, there was no evidence that any dripgas had been stolen, 
and the officers had only a "hunch" that anyone on the road at 
that time of night was up to no good. 
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Even if it is assumed that officers Wright and Kirby 
intended only to stop vehicles matching the description of the 
vehicles going into the canyon, they were still acting on nothing 
more than a "hunch". The officers had no way of distinguishing 
Wade and Bartley from ranchers hauling water for their cows, or 
farmers hauling fuel for their farm implements. They had no 
evidence that a crime had been committed until more than an hour 
later. 
If the initial stop was illegal, there is no need to 
examine the lawfulness of the arrest. However, arrest requires a 
finding of probable cause that a crime had been committed. At 
this time the officers knew only that Wade and Bartley possessed 
something that smelled like dripgas. They had no evidence that 
the dripgas had been illegally obtained. 
The District Court's decision to admit testimony that 
Bartley was carrying a handgun when stopped added nothing 
relevant to the trial of the case and could serve only to 
persuade the jury that Bartley was a "criminal". Likewise, the 
testimony concerning disappearance of the impounded vehicles 
added nothing to the jury's understanding of the case and served 
only to suggest that Bartley was involved in that crime, tending 
to fortify the impression that he is likely to commit a crime. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PEACE OFFICERS' USE OF A ROADBLOCK 
TO APPREHEND SUSPECTS OF A PARTICULAR 
CRIME WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY STRONG 
EVIDENCE THAT A CRIME HAD ACTUALLY 
OCCURRED. 
The road block set up by Officers Wright and Kirby in 
this case is different from the kind approved in dicta by the U. 
S. Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).l 
Such roadblocks involve routine stops of every driver, or every 
fifth driver, for a short period of time to check license and 
registration. The officer's discretion to select individuals for 
investigation is serverely limited. 
This case involves a roadblock to stop every vehicle on 
a particular road because of the officers1 suspicion that anyone 
on that road at that time of night would bear some investigation. 
We have not uncovered any Utah cases in which the power of the 
police to establish such roadblocks is discussed. However, cases 
in other jurisdictions make clear that such roadblocks are 
approved only in cases of the highest emergency. 
In Washington v. Silvernail, 25 Wash. App. 185, 605 
P.2d 1279 (1980) cert, denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980), the police 
were notified of an assault and burglary by the victim. The 
lSome states have invalidated such roadblocks under state 
constitutional provisions. Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 
755 P.2d 775 (1988); Idaho v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 
1057 (1988). But see Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 
P.2d 1299 (1987). 
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victim*s report of the perpetrator *s statements suggested they 
would be using the ferry. The police then set up a roadblock at 
the ferry dock and searched all cars on the ferry, discovering 
evidence identifying the perpetrators. 
In affirming the conviction, the Court stated: 
Roadblocks to capture fleeing suspects, therefore, 
can only be upheld in cases of the highest 
emergency . . . . 
In the present case, the officers had probable 
cause to believe a serious felony had been 
committed. Information about the nature of the 
crime and the means of flight had been reliably 
reported by the victim. This information was 
coupled with special circumstances which justified 
the officers' action at the ferry dock: the crime 
was violent; it was highly unlikely that the 
felons were on the ferry; and there was only one 
means of departing the ferry. There was, 
therefore, a reasonable likelihood of success and 
a minimal intrusion on the traveling public. 
Id.t 25 Wash. App. 185, 605 P.2d 1279 at 1283. 
The Alaska Supreme Court amplified on the requirements 
for such roadblocks in Lacy v. Alaska, 608 P.2d 19 (1980): 
[W]hile the roadblock tactic as compared to the 
typical stop and frisk situation, requires more 
evidence that a crime has occurred, by its very 
nature it requires less evidence that any 
particular vehicle stopped is occupied by the 
perpetrator of that crime. (Emphasis in 
original.} 
Id., 608 P.2d 19 at 21, quoting with approval from 3 W. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure 9.5 at 142-143 (1978) . 
For the kind of roadblock set up by Wright and Kirby, 
there must be more evidence that a crime was committed than with 
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an investigatory stop. The crime must be a serious felony. None 
of these requirements is met in this case. The peace officers 
had no evidence that a crime had been committed except their own 
speculation. The crime was a non-violent theft. The officer had 
no knowledge that the value o:f the property stolen would cause 
the theft to amount to a felony. 
In each search and seizure case, a balance must be 
drawn between the interest in apprehending the guilty and the 
public's right to be secure in their property. In this case, the 
peace officers incorrectly concluded that the balance was tilted 
to setting up a roadblock. However, none of the factors 
justifying a roadblock were present. The roadblock was unlawful. 
II. THE PEACE OFFICERS HAD NO REASONABLE 
SUSPICION THAT BARTLEY HAD COMMITTED 
A CRIME. 
The Utah rule governing investigatory stops is codified 
in Section 77-7-15, Utah Code (1988). That rule developed over 
the years as the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the search and 
seizure provisions of the Utah and U. S. Constitutions. The law 
requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion by the peace officer 
that the person stopped has committed a public offense. 
This reasonable suspicion standard has been applied in 
State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985) (description of two 
men seen in area by another officer two hours previously 
insufficient to give officer reasonable suspicion to stop two men 
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walking at 1:40 a.m. three blocks from burglary), State v. 
Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986) (officer lacked reasonable 
suspicion to stop auto with out-of-state plates moving slowly at 
3:00 a.m. through neighborhood where rash of burglaries had 
recently occurred), and State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 
1987) (Mexican appearance, California plates, route, time, 
"erratic" driving with police car tailing two to six feet behind, 
and nervous behavior after stop insufficient for reasonable 
suspicion). 
This Court has interpreted the reasonable suspicion 
standard in State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987) (late 
hour, high crime area, nervous conduct and "suspicious" nylon 
knapsack insufficient to justify stop) and State v. Baird, 763 
P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988) (something funny about out-of-state 
license plate insufficient). 
In State v. Baumgaertel, 762 P.2d 2 (Utah App. 1988), 
this Court analyzed its prior decisions and those of the Utah 
Supreme Court and concluded that "travelling in a lawful manner 
at a late hour in a high crime area"2 is not enough to support an 
investigatory stop. The stop was justified, however, because the 
car had entered the parking lot of Ernie's Automotive eight hours 
after the shop had closed, and clearly had no legitimate reason 
to be there. 
2ld., 762 P.2d 2 at 4 
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These cases make clear that Wade and Bartley could not 
be stopped just because they were driving late at night through 
an area where thefts had recently occurred. One searches in vain 
for additional factors to elevate the officers' "hunch" to a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion. The peace officers could not 
possibly have observed the tank before the stop. Even if they 
had, there is nothing out of the ordinary about pickups, trailers 
and tanks on a county road serving the Navajo reservation, farms, 
ranches, and the oil field. If this stop was justified, any 
rancher carrying water to his cows, any Navajo hauling water to 
his hogan, or any farmer hauling fuel for his tractor is subject 
to being stopped when he drives on this county road. Such an 
intrusion on the security of the people is not justified. 
As a natural consequence of the unlawfulness of the 
investigatory stop, all evidence obtained pursuant thereto must 
be excluded, including the evidence obtained pursuant to the 
subsequent arrest. 
III. THE ARREST WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE 
CAUSE. 
If the initial investigatory stop was invalid, it is 
unnecessary to examine the propriety of the arrest, since an 
arrest cannot be supported by evidence unlawfully obtained.3 The 
arrest, however, must be justified by reasonable, probable cause, 
3state v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988) 
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not just a reasonable, articulable suspicion.4 it must appear 
from the evidence then available to the officer that the accused, 
more likely than not, had committed a felony. The officers in 
this case knew only 1) that it was 1:00 a.m., 2) that there had 
been thefts of dripgas in the anea, and 3) that there was a smell 
like that of dripgas around ±tie ^ ehxcies.. The peace officers 
were relying on their experience in other oil fields with other 
condensate in concluding thai: th^ tanks carried dripgas. More 
importantly, they concluded that the dripgas could not have been 
legally obtained. There is no evidence in the record, however, 
showing that condensate or dripgas cannot be lawfully purchased. 
The statefs own witness. Knuckles, testified that dripgas was 
available in Farmington, New Mexico, and he had used dripgas in 
his vehicle until it damaged his engine. 
Wright and Kirby assumed that what they smelled was 
dripgas, that the dripgas had been stolen, and that it had been 
stolen from one of the oil fields in the area. However, they had 
no evidence beyond their own conjecture that any dripgas had been 
stolen, or that Wade and Bartley had stolen it. 
Since the arrest was not supported by probable or 
reasonable cause, the evidence obtained pursuant thereto should 
have been excluded. 
4section 77-7-2(2), Utah Code (1988) 
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IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
EVIDENCE OF LITTLE OR NO RELEVANCE WITH 
A HIGH PROBABILITY OF PREJUDICING THE JURY 
The District Court permitted, over Bartleyfs objection 
the introduction of evidence that Bartley put a gun in his pants 
when he was stopped on a county road at 1:00 a.m., by an 
unidentified vehicle. That xailing is incorrect. The jury is 
entitled to hear all relevantS evidence whose relevance outweighs 
its possible prejudicial effect.6 
The jury was charged with determining whether Bartley 
had committed a nonviolent theft of gas condensate worth less 
than $1,000.00, which had been left in a tank in eastern San Juan 
County. It was not charged with determining whether he had used 
a firearm in committing a crime, or whether he unlawfully 
possessed a firearm.7 
The firearm had nothing whatsoever to do with the 
theft. The only conceivable relevance is that perhaps people who 
are carrying a gun are more likely to have recently committed a 
crime than people who are not carrying a gun. The prosecution 
did not present any statistical evidence to support this 
proposition, perhaps because the evidence would be character 
5Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
6Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
^Carrying a concealed loaded firearm or carrying a loaded 
firearm in a vehicle are crimes. See Section 76-10-504 and 
505, Utah Code (1988). 
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evidence of a type prohibited by Ruie 404 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
In contrast to the minimal or nonexistent relevance of 
Bartley's possession of a handgun stands the very real prospect 
of juror bias when presented with evidence that the accused 
carried a gun in his belt. The evidence tends to portray Bartley 
as a lawless, gunslinger type. The jury might very well have 
been affected by such a portrayal. In the face of possible 
significant juror bias from marginally relevant evidence, the 
proper approach, under Rule 403, is to exclude the evidence. 
This the District Court failed to do. 
The District Court erred even more seriously when it 
permitted the introduction of evidence about the disappearance of 
the trucks, tanks and trailers from the impound yard. The 
District Court justified its ruling by stating that he had heard 
too many arguments about lack of evidence and that defense 
counsel could not have it both ways. That argument would have 
some value if explaining why evidence is lacking makes up in some 
way for its absence. The plain truth was that the sheriff's 
office did not have samples from the tanks. Why it did not may 
have been relevant to an inquiry about police procedures, but it 
was not relevant to Bartleyfs guilt. 
The unspoken assumption, which the jury could not 
possibly have missed, is that Bartley or someone under his 
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direction, had engineered the disappearance of the vehicles. It 
necessarily followed that he would not have done so unless there 
was evidence in or on the vehicles tending to implicate him. 
However, the prosecution had insufficient evidence that Bartley 
had been involved in the disappearance to bind him over from 
circuit court. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed a criminal conviction 
in State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583 (1984) for erroneous admission 
of evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant. In so 
doing, it stated that: 
Such evidence of the commission of other crimes 
must be used with extreme caution because of the 
prejudicial effect it may have on the trier of 
fact. (Citation omitted) . . . . 
In light of the marginal probative value of the 
robbery evidence and of the generally recognized 
danger that jurors hearing evidence of another 
crime may be unduly prejudiced against them, we 
hold that the trial judge abused his discretion 
under Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Id. 699 P.2d 583 at 584-585. 
The District Court had a duty to exclude evidence that 
did not tend to show that Bartley had or had not committed the 
theft with which he was charged. It had a duty to exclude 
evidence whose prejudicial impact far exceeded its relevance. It 
failed to do so when it permitted testimony that Bartley had 
carried a concealed weapon, and testimony implying that Bartley 
had tampered with evidence, when the State in fact had no 
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evidence sufficient to bind Bartley over on that charge. 
Conclusion 
The District Court erred in denying the motion to 
suppress and admitting evidence gathered pursuant to an unlawful 
roadblock, investigatory stop and arrest. It also erroneously 
admitted prejudicial evidence with little or no probative value* 
This Court should reverse and remand this case for a new trial 
with directions to the District Court to grant the Motion to 
Suppress and exclude the other prejudicial evidence. 
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